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Chiefly Power in a Frontline State: Kgosi
Linchwe II, the Bakgatla and Botswana
in the South African Liberation Struggle,
1948–1994*
Louisa Cantwell
(Faculty of History, University of Cambridge; Macmillan Center for
International and Area Studies, Yale University)
Kgosi Linchwe II of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela – a cross-border chieftainship in Botswana and
South Africa – was at the centre of a network of trans-frontier links that played an important
role in the liberation struggle in South Africa. In the context of the reluctant inaction of
Botswana’s national government, as a state surrounded by states under South African
influence and economically dependent upon them, this case demonstrates a hitherto hidden
aspect of the activities of the liberation movements in the region. The case of Linchwe II
demonstrates the ways in which the authority, influence and connections that underpinned his
chiefly power made it possible to assist the liberation movements in ways that the state
government was unable to do because of concerns for national security. This study reveals a
hidden history of involvement in the struggle that has been obscured by the historiographical
focus on the international politics of Botswana, using a deep, micro-historical focus on a
region that was highly involved in, connected with and affected by the South African
liberation struggle.
Introduction
In May 2012 Thabo Mbeki spoke at a gala dinner held by the Sir Ketumile Masire Foundation
in Gaborone. In a speech in which he paid tribute to the role of Botswana in the South African
liberation struggle, Mbeki’s recollections capture the intense difficulties faced by the
governments of Seretse Khama and Masire in balancing the compulsion to support the anti-
apartheid movements and being hamstrung by dependence on the minority-rule regimes that
almost entirely surrounded the recently independent and economically fragile state. In this
context of fraught diplomacy at the national level, it was the role of individual agency that
made it possible for Botswana to be a ‘genuine Frontline State’ which ‘played a critical role in
the struggle to end the apartheid system’.1 Mbeki focused on three individuals who all
q 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/Licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
*I am indebted to my informants, to Professor Fred Morton and Sandy Grant in Botswana for their time and valuable
insight, to my supervisor Dr EmmaHunter, to Dr Paul La Hausse de Lalouvie`re and Dr Tim Gibbs at the University of
Cambridge for their valuable comments, to the ABORNEWinter School in St Louis, Senegal, in January 2013, and to
the anonymous JSAS readers, for their helpful commentary. This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities
Research Council, the Smuts Memorial Fund, the Royal Historical Society, the Fox International Fellowship at Yale
University, and Sidney Sussex College, University of Cambridge, without whose generous funding this research
would not have been possible.
1 Thabo Mbeki, ‘Address of the Patron of the Thabo Mbeki Foundation at the Sir Ketumile Masire Foundation
Fund-Raising Dinner, Gaborone’, 11 May 2012, transcript of speech available at http://www.
thabombekifoundation.org.za/Pages/FundRaising-DinnerGaborone.aspx, retrieved 6 January 2015.
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operated outside the main sphere of central government and the ruling Botswana Democratic
Party (BDP). The role of the first, the African National Congress (ANC) member, Treason
Trialist and radical politician Motsamai Mpho, has already received significant attention, and
his contribution to the struggle is well-documented.2 The second was Simon Hirschfeld, who
became the first Motswana Commissioner of the Botswana police force in 1971, and who had
played a key role in attempting to organise safe passage for Steve Biko into and out of
Botswana in 1976. But perhaps the most intriguing case of individual action from within
Botswana heralded by Mbeki was that of Kgosi Linchwe II of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela,
operating in his cross-border chieftainship centred on Mochudi – forty kilometres north of
Gaborone. Mbeki identified Linchwe as a crucial part of the ‘underground ANC machinery’
that had been established in Botswana prior to the opening of the office of the ANC’s official
representative in Gaborone in 1974.3
This assertion has dual significance. It publicly acknowledged, for perhaps the first time,
the routes through Bakgatla territory that served as conduits for members of the liberation
movements moving into and out of South Africa, alongside the well-documented crossing
points of Lobatse and Francistown. But by celebrating the role of Kgosi Linchwe II in this
network, Mbeki also prompted important questions about the nature and resilience of the
institution of chieftainship in this region. To what extent was it Linchwe’s chiefly status and
authority that made his participation in the ANC’s ‘underground machinery’ so effective?
Did the resilience of the trans-frontier networks of power and influence based on the
institution of chieftainship enable political engagement of this type to bypass the hamstrung
Botswana state, which had been rendered powerless to support the liberation movements
publicly?
Analyses of the geopolitical situation that necessitated the foreign policy choices of the
national government dominate the existing historiography concerning Botswana’s role in the
South African liberation struggle. Many scholars have assessed the dilemmas faced by
Botswana’s government in balancing the moral obligations of participation against the danger
to territorial and human security posed by the constant threat of economic blockades and
violations of its borders.4 J.H. Polhemus’ conceptualisation of Botswana’s approach to its
geopolitical dilemma as the ‘non-springboard’ policy, whereby the government could not
afford to be seen to permit violent activity to be launched from within its borders, became part
of contemporary discourse, and remains significant.5 Much contemporary literature centred
on the diplomatic aspect of Botswana’s position as an ‘island’ of successful majority rule in a
region overshadowed by apartheid.6 Where studies have explored the impact of the struggle
2 J.A. Mu¨ller, The Inevitable Pipeline into Exile: Botswana’s Role in the Namibian Liberation Struggle (Basel,
BaselerAfrikaBibliographien, 2012), p. 110; M. Mpho and W. Edge, The Autobiography of MotsamaiMpho
(Gaborone, Lebopo, 1996); H. Macmillan, The Lusaka Years: The ANC in Exile in Zambia (Johannesburg,
Jacana, 2013), p. 28; South Africa Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Africa (Cape
Town, Zebra Press, 2004), p. 414.
3 Mbeki, ‘Address of the Patron’.
4 M.G. Molomo, ‘Civil and Military Relations in Botswana’s Developmental State, African Studies Quarterly, 5,
2 (Summer 2001), pp. 37–59; B.Z. Osei-Hwedie, ‘The Role of Botswana in the Liberation of Southern Africa
since 1966’, inW.A. Edge andM.H. Lekorwe, Botswana: Politics and Society (Pretoria, J.L. Van Schaik, 1998),
pp. 425–39; J. Hanlon and P. Spray, ‘Botswana: Cautious but Outspoken’, in J. Hanlon, Beggar Your
Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (London, James Currey, 1986), pp. 219–34; P.T. Mgadla,
‘“A Good Measure of Sacrifice”: Botswana and the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa (1965–85)’, Social
Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies, 34, 1 (2008), pp. 5–16.
5 J.H. Polhemus, ‘Botswana’s Role in the Liberation of Southern Africa’, in L.A. Picard, The Evolution of Modern
Botswana: Politics and Rural Development in Southern Africa (London, Collings, 1985), pp. 228–70.
6 R.Dale,Botswana’s Search forAutonomy in SouthernAfrica (London,GreenwoodPress, 1995); C.Coker, ‘South
Africa: A NewMilitary Role in Southern Africa 1969–82’, in R. Jaster (ed.), Southern Africa: Regional Security
Problems and Prospects (Aldershot, Gower, 1985), pp. 142–50; M. Evans, ‘The Front-Line States, South Africa
and Southern African Security: Military Prospects and Perspectives’, Zambezia, 7 (1984/5), pp. 1–19.
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on Botswana’s society, they have focused largely on the practical and political impact of the
considerable refugee traffic through Botswana in this period.7 Recent work has begun to
acknowledge a greater degree of participation of Botswana in the liberation struggles of
neighbouring countries than has been documented in studies focusing on high-level politics
and diplomacy.8
This article seeks to continue the expansion of the historiography of Botswana’s role in
southern Africa’s liberation struggles by exploring the existence of previously undocumented
networks that took the struggle across the border with South Africa. These links and
connections facilitated a significant degree of assistance and protection afforded to members
of the liberation movements across an extended period of time, in a region that has thus far
been left out of existing accounts of Batswana involvement. Central to this study is the crucial
significance within these networks of Kgosi Linchwe II, as the most prominent figure of
traditional authority among the Bakgatla people and whose territory straddled the border.
This example will demonstrate the ways in which the authority, influence and connections
that underpinned Linchwe’s chiefly power enabled him to assist the liberation movements in
moving through his trans-frontier community in ways that were impossible for the national
government. This article seeks to document the role of the Bakgatla people in the struggle,
and to situate the particular case of Kgosi Linchwe II within a wider context of the potential
roles and channels made possible by the existence of traditional authority alongside the
national political system in Botswana in this period.
The article makes use of archival documents, official records and newspaper collections
consulted in the Botswana National Archives and the University of Botswana in Gaborone
between June 2012 and September 2013, and in the recently migrated archival records in the
National Archives at Kew. A series of oral historical interviews were also conducted, the
contents of which have been used to triangulate evidence from contemporary newspaper
reports and official records. The interviews were also an invaluable conduit by which it was
possible to gain access to anecdotal information not found previously in documentary sources
because of the clandestine nature of the activities that this article documents. Where this was
the case, the evidence has been triangulated with follow-up interviews. The interviews were
carried out in June–October 2012 and July–September 2013, in Botswana and South Africa.
Full transcripts of all interviews are available. In one case, a face-to-face interview was not
possible for logistical reasons and so the communication took place via email. One interview
with an expatriate informant was conducted in London, and information from subsequent
written personal communications has also been deployed in this article. Similarly, written
personal communications with a key figure in Mochudi continued after leaving the field, and
were useful in further triangulating evidence.Written transcripts for these communications are
available. The first informants were identified as those known to have had close connections
with Kgosi Linchwe II during the period of the struggle, those who have publicly discussed
their role in assisting the liberationmovements from bases in Botswana in different areas of the
borderlands, and those connected to the incidents described in contemporary media and
government reports. These interviews proved fruitful in terms of source material and for
7 R.J. Southall, ‘Botswana as a Host Country for Refugees’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,
22, 2 (1984), pp. 151–79; M. Rwelamira, Refugees in a Chess Game: Reflections on Botswana, Lesotho and
Swaziland’s Refugee Policies (Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1990); Q.N. Parsons,
‘The Pipeline: Botswana’s Reception of Refugees, 1956–68’, Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies,
34, 1 (2008), pp. 17–32.
8 C. Saunders, ‘Botswana and the Liberation of Southern Africa’, Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies,
34, 1 (2008), pp. 2–4; W.G. Morapedi, ‘The Dilemmas of Liberation in Southern Africa: The Case of
Zimbabwean Liberation Movements and Botswana, 1960–1979’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 38, 1
(2012), pp. 73–90; M.M. Bolaane, ‘Cross-Border Lives, Warfare and Rape in Independence-Era Botswana’,
Journal of Southern African Studies, 39, 3 (2013), pp. 557–76.
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suggestions of further potential informants who had been part of the networks that worked to
assist the liberationmovements. These suggestions were followed up, and several proved to be
valuable in a similar way. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject material, the
informants, where appropriate, have been anonymised. Key details including initials, date and
place of interview have been retained, and the necessary contextual details have been included.
Kgosi Linchwe II and the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela
The Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community straddles the colonially imposed international border
between Botswana and South Africa. It is one of many such partitioned groups across the
continent; a community identity based on the territorial limits of the Bakgatla
chieftainship has proved resilient to the present day. In 1870 over half the population
moved northwards into the Bechuanaland Protectorate to escape the increasingly violent
demands for labour from Kruger’s authorities in the Transvaal. Some stayed, however, and
the Bakgatla kgosi9 has remained the recognised traditional authority of those resident in
either country. The Bakgatla capital is Mochudi, in Botswana, and throughout this period the
kgosi nominated a deputy to sit at Moruleng in the North-West province of South Africa. The
Kgatleng district forms the ‘Botswana’ section of the Bakgatla chieftaincy, where Kgosi
Linchwe II presided between 1963 and 2007. The artificial nature of the border meant that it
was not only physically porous, because it was sparsely patrolled, but also ideologically
porous. The lives of members of Bakgatla society transcended the demarcation in many ways,
the deepest being kinship networks, family links and temporary flows and migrations. Older
residents in Mochudi recall many Bakgatla who were resident in Botswana regularly
travelling to South Africa for work, usually living there for nine months in every year.10 The
territorial distinction and the frontier made little practical or ideological difference to
Linchwe’s chiefly authority.
Between 1948 and 1994, therefore, the Bakgatla straddled a hugely significant political
frontier. While part of the territory lay in apartheid South Africa, the remaining section was
located within the British Bechuanaland Protectorate until the creation of independent
Botswana. Important parallels can be drawn with other ‘traditional’ or pre-existing
communities and identities that straddled South Africa’s borders, many of which had
networks and channels of communication that transcended the boundaries of either nation
state and facilitated movement and activity into and out of the apartheid state. These include
the BaHurutshe, BaTlokwa, Barolong, Babirwa and Bamalete across the Botswana border,
the KaNgwane Bantustan on the Swaziland border,11 and the Transkei Bantustan, which
shared a border with Lesotho.12 All of these cases saw significant cross-border traffic
throughout this period. The fundamental ties and obligations underpinning such a cross-
border community meant that the Bakgatla were embedded within the struggle against
apartheid in South Africa, with geographical, political, social and familial connections that
facilitated a high level of local participation in clandestine activity.
9 Chief; the plural is dikgosi.
10 Group interview, 13 September 2012. This group was put together by Kgosi Segale Linchwe in Mochudi, as a
group of men of between 60 and 80 years of age. The questions focused on everyday life in Mochudi and
experiences of connections with South Africa that existed for work, commerce, and kinship across the time
period addressed in this article.
11 M.S. Ginindza, ‘KaNgwane: A Life in and Beyond’, South African Historical Journal, 64, 1 (2012),
pp. 144–51.
12 T. Gibbs,Mandela’s Kinsmen: Nationalist Elites and Apartheid’s First Bantustan (Woodbridge, James Currey,
2014).
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While one aim of this article is to address the lack of scholarly work concerning a part of
Botswana’s ‘underground machinery’ in the liberation struggles of southern Africa,13 the
major significance of this case lies in the role played by the central figure of Kgosi Linchwe
II. Utilising the authority he held as chief of the Bakgatla, he was the driving force behind the
support networks that helped members of the liberation movements to cross the border and
move through Bakgatla territory. The political action of a chief here demonstrates the ways in
which traditional authority could be used as an alternative channel for political action in a
context where the national government’s influence was limited by considerations of national
security and diplomacy. Just as Arianna Lissoni has recently illustrated in the case of the
Bahurutshe chief Kgosi Moiloa, the case of Kgosi Linchwe II demonstrates the way in which
chieftaincy remained highly significant as a structure for political mobilisation in a rural
area.14 This is an interesting and significant divergence from much of the historiography
concerning traditional authority in this region,15 which has only recently begun to
acknowledge the ways in which hereditary structures retained or regained a perhaps
surprising degree of legitimacy and influence despite the damaging and disruptive impacts of
the imposition of indirect rule policies by colonial administrations.16 Though the
manipulation and coercion of positions of traditional or hereditary authority was
undoubtedly widespread, and is particularly evident in the creation of the Bantustans in
South Africa,17 there are cases, such as this one, where the power and influence exercised by
chiefs remained legitimate and resilient through this period. While the National Party’s
restructuring of South African rural society after the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act resulted in a
system of government in which ‘power rested with a hierarchy of compliant chiefs’,18 recent
historical research has brought to light a number of instances – such as those demonstrated in
Tembuland, Sekhukhuneland, Eastern Mpondoland, Bophuthatswana, and Lehurutshe – that
demonstrate the ways in which certain individuals who had inherited chiefly status or were
connected to networks of traditional authority spearheaded resistance to the national
government, and in some cases were directly involved with the liberation movements.19 This
analysis of the case of Kgosi Linchwe II and the Bakgatla continues in the same vein as this
13 In many discussions of the role of South Africa’s neighbours in facilitating activity connected to the liberation
struggle, there is little or no mention of Botswana or members of its population, for example: N. Worden, The
Making of Modern South Africa (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995), p. 115; South Africa Democracy Education Trust,
The Road to Democracy in South Africa (Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2004); J. Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness:
Confessions of Apartheid’s Assassins (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball, 1997).
14 A. Lissoni, ‘Chieftaincy and Resistance Politics in Lehurutshe during the Apartheid Era’, New Contree, 67
(November 2013), p. 58.
15 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1996); L. Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of Land in
South Africa (Leiden, Brill, 2005).
16 J. Willis, ‘Chieftaincy’, in R. Reid and J. Parker (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern African History
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 208–23; S.E. Cook, ‘Chiefs, Kings, Corporatization and
Democracy: A South African Case Study’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, 7, 1 (Summer/Fall 2005), p. 12;
J. Michael Williams, Chieftaincy, the State and Democracy: Political Legitimacy in Post-Apartheid South
Africa (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 12; J. Fokwang, Mediating Legitimacy: Chieftaincy
and Democracy in two African Chiefdoms (Bamenda, Langaa Research and Publishing CIG, 2009), p. 18.
17 J.C. Myers, Indirect Rule in South Africa: Tradition, Modernity and the Costuming of Political Power
(Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 2008), p. 66; P. Harries, ‘Exclusion, Classification and Internal
Colonialism: The Emergence of Ethnicity Amongst the Tsonga-Speakers of South Africa’, in L. Vail (ed.), The
Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991), p. 108; M. Lange,
Lineages of Despotism and Development: British Colonialism and State Power (London, University of Chicago
Press, 2009), pp. 181–2; C. Crais, ‘Custom and the Politics of Sovereignty in South Africa’, Journal of Social
History, 39, 5 (2006), p. 732.
18 I. van Kessel and B. Oomen, ‘One Chief, One Vote: The Revival of Traditional Authorities in Post-Apartheid
South Africa’, African Affairs, 96, 385 (1997), p. 563.
19 Gibbs, Mandela’s Kinsmen; Various Authors, Special Issue: Let’s Talk About Bantustans, South African
Historical Journal, 64, 1 (2012), pp. 1–157.
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recent work. In exploring previously hidden aspects of the liberation struggle in South Africa,
it demonstrates an alternative aspect to links between chieftainship and the struggle in
sharp contrast to the ties between Bantustan politics and co-opted traditional authority
structures that have hitherto received most scholarly attention.
The case of Kgosi Linchwe II and the Bakgatla speaks to the burgeoning literature on the
resilience and socio-political significance of chieftainship in 20th-century southern Africa,20
and to debates concerning the endurance of cross-border communities amid strong networks
and flows of people and ideas.21 This is particularly interesting when considered within the
context of the liberation struggles in the region, and provides fresh insight into the role a
figure of traditional authority was able to play. Recent research has begun to examine
previously unexplored local aspects of the struggle outside the much-documented urban
ferment and transcontinental network of the liberation movements in exile in this period.
Regional rural areas have been identified as vital sources of support,22 and have been
important in liberation struggles elsewhere on the continent.23 Thus important, but perhaps
unexpected, involvement in the recruitment process for the armed movements was
undertaken by certain traditional authorities within South Africa.24 The South African
liberation struggle relied upon a diverse and complex network of local actors carrying out
significant tasks that were fundamental to its operations, survival, and later success. What is
yet to be explored is the extent of this network beyond South Africa’s borders, in spaces
outside the well-documented training camps.25 The analysis of cross-border political activity
in a frontier region here demonstrates ways in which the channels of movement for members
of the liberation movements were facilitated by the actions of individuals and personal
networks at a local level – outside the sphere of national-level diplomacy.
20 For example: J. Willis, ‘Chieftaincy’, in Reid and Parker (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern African
History, pp. 208–23; B. Oomen, Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Power and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era
(Oxford, James Currey, 2005); S. Berry, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Poverty, Power and the Past
in Asante, 1896–1996 (Oxford, James Currey, 2001); C. Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan:
Histories in the Making of Chiefship, Community and State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); E.
A.B van Rouveroy, ‘Chieftaincy in Africa: Three Facets of a Hybrid Role’, in E.A.B van Rouveroy and R. van
Dijk (eds), African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape (Mu¨nster, Lit Verlag, 1999), pp. 21–48;
C. Lund, ‘Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa’, Development and Change, 37, 4
(2006), pp. 685–705; Ø. Gulbrandsen, The State and the Social: State Formation in Botswana and its
Precolonial and Colonial Genealogies (New York, Berghahn Books, 2012).
21 A.I. Asiwaju, Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa’s International Boundaries 1884–1984
(New York, St Martin’s Press, 1985).
22 T. Gibbs, ‘Chris Hani’s “Country Bumpkins”: Regional Networks in the African National Congress
Underground, 1974–1994’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 37, 4 (2011), pp. 677–91; L. Switzer, Power
and Resistance in an African Society (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).
23 N. Bhebe and T. Ranger, Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (London, James Currey, 1996); N.J. Kriger,
Zimbabwe’s Guerilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992); B. Berman and
J. Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, Vol. 2 (London, James Currey, 1992); J.S. Saul,
‘African Peasants and Revolution’, Review of African Political Economy, 1,1 (1974), pp. 41–68; T.H.
Hendriksen, ‘People’s War in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau’, Journal of Modern African Studies,
14, 3 (1976), pp. 377–99; J.B. Forrest, ‘Guinea-Bissau Since Independence: A Decade of Domestic Power
Struggles’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 1 (1987), pp. 95–116.
24 R. Suttner, ‘Culture(s) of the African National Congress of South Africa: Imprint of Exile Experiences’, Journal
of Contemporary African Studies, 21, 2 (2003), p. 310; Ntsebeza, Democracy Compromised, p. 260; A. Manson
and J. Drummond, ‘The Transformation of Moiloa’s Reserve in the Western Transvaal: Politics, Production and
Resistance in a Rural Setting, 1919–1986’, paper presented at the University of the Witwatersrand History
Workshop: Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid (1990), available at http://hdl.handle.net/
10539/7911, retrieved 2 February 2014, p. 11; P. Delius, The Lion Amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and
Resistance in the Northern Transvaal (Oxford, James Currey, 1996), p. 120.
25 T. Lodge, ‘State of Exile: The ANC of South Africa, 1976–86’, in P. Frankel, N. Pines and M. Swilling (eds),
State, Resistance and Change in South Africa (London, Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 229–58; S. Ellis, ‘Mobokodo:
Security in ANC Camps, 1961–1990’, African Affairs, 93, 371 (1994), pp. 279–98; G. Seidman, ‘Guerrillas in
their Midst: Armed Struggle in the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement’, Mobilization: An International
Quarterly, 6, 2 (2001), pp. 111–27.
260 Journal of Southern African Studies
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
am
br
idg
e U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
4:3
6 2
8 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
Kgosi Linchwe II’s position as Bakgatla chief afforded him a legitimacy and authority
that operated alongside that of the national government in Botswana. His networks,
connections and resources were derived from an institution of traditional authority that was
distinct from the state in a way that could be effective and important to the liberation struggle.
His chieftainship was an example of one of Lund’s ‘twilight institutions’,26 capable of
exercising public authority at a local level and bypassing the state, but still an integral part of
the process of state formation in postcolonial Botswana.27 In independent Botswana, the
continued significance and resilience of the authority that underpins chieftainship can be
explained by locating them within this intermediary sphere. In the context of a recently
formulated national state, built upon structures of colonial rule, the institutions of government
lack a monopoly of control over the exercise of public authority. An incorporative
understanding of the nature of local authority is needed in order to recognise the ways in
which power is vested in individuals and institutions which may appear and operate in a
manner very different from that of the central government, but are none the less significant.
The institution of chieftainship in Botswana has been one such intermediary source of
authority, based on ‘legitimacy that is rooted in culture and tradition, in a completely different
rationale from that of the state’.28
It was the ability to operate in this intermediary context that made possible Linchwe’s
involvement in assisting members of the liberation movements operating in the territory under
his jurisdiction. He had the authority and influence of a local community leader, which was
derived wholly from his chiefly position and the hierarchical power structures that underpinned
his role. But, on the fringes of the central government structures – sitting in the advisory-only
House of Chiefs, and a member of the Kgatleng District Council – his actions were not limited
by the high political considerations that necessarily preoccupied the central government figures.
With the centre’s options severely limited, it was only individuals on the periphery of
government who could operate in support of the liberationmovements. In themain, this support
was limited to the extreme efforts of individuals, such as Motsamai Mpho, Mike Dingake and
Fish Keitseng.29 But in Mochudi, Linchwe was able to combine a personal political
commitment with the authority vested in his position as kgosi to effect real and significant
support for those travelling across the border that transected the territory under his jurisdiction.
Botswana: Independence or Dependence?
Throughout this period Botswana was almost entirely surrounded by the minority-rule and
increasingly defensive regimes of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South
West Africa (Namibia), with only a 100-yard border with Zambia, at Kazungula. Landlocked,
drought-prone, and lacking the agricultural or industrial development for self-sufficiency,
Botswana was economically dependent on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, as markets
for its staple export, beef, and for the rail and port links that were essential for trade.30 The
potential for blocks and delays on these channels was a real threat to the survival of its
population.31 Botswana used the rand as currency until 1976, as part of the Southern African
26 Lund, ‘Twilight Institutions’.
27 Gulbrandsen, The State and the Social, p. 1.
28 Oomen, Chiefs in South Africa, p. 27.
29 Mpho and Edge, The Autobiography of Motsamai Mpho; M. Dingake, My Fight Against Apartheid (London,
Kliptown Books, 1987); F. Keitseng, J. Ramsay and B. Morton, Comrade Fish:Memories of a Motswana in the
ANC Underground (Gaborone, Pula Press, 1999).
30 Mgadla, ‘A Good Measure of Sacrifice’, p. 5; Osei-Hwedie, ‘The Role of Botswana’, p. 425.
31 Hanlon and Spray, ‘Botswana: Cautious but Outspoken’, p. 220.
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Customs Union. Militarily, Botswana was extremely weak – the army, the Botswana
Defence Force, was formed only in 1977, prior to which the only armed defence came from
the very small armed wing of the police. The South African aim of incorporating Botswana
into South Africa constantly threatened its very existence. In 1972, the Bophuthatswana
Bantustan was declared a self-governing homeland. The seven isolated enclaves situated on
or near the frontier incorporated the Bakgatla lands that lay within within South Africa.32 In
1982, South Africa built dams on the headwaters of rivers within Bophuthatswana that flowed
into Botswana,33 threatening its water supply. For its part, Botswana refused to recognise the
independence of Bophuthatswana, despite persistent pressure from South Africa.34 In 1979,
South Africa announced its vision of a Constellation of Southern African States
(CONSAS),35 aiming to expand South African influence and economic dominance over
the subcontinent.36
President Seretse Khama set out his response to dealing with the reality of dependence on
the apartheid regime at the first National Assembly meeting on 6 October 1966. Botswana’s
precarious situation meant that its territory could not ‘be used as a base for the organisation or
direction of violent activities directed towards other states’.37 He went on, however, to
provide assurances that Botswana would ‘continue to offer genuine political refugees a safe
haven’. This pragmatic approach to dealing with Botswana’s precarious situation,38 the ‘non-
springboard approach’,39 remained the official stance until 1994. Within the confines of the
policy, the government of Botswana nevertheless formally recognised the ANC, and allowed
it to open an office in Gaborone from 1974.40 It was also a founder member of the ‘Front Line
States’ and was active in the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
(SADCC) which excluded South Africa.41 Both Khama and Masire refused repeated attempts
by the South African government to sign a form of pact or non-aggression treaty similar to the
Nkomati Accord signed with Mozambique in 1984.42
The term ‘refugee’ was both political and problematic, especially given Botswana’s
ideological sympathies with the liberation movements in South Africa. The categorisation of
individuals necessarily overlapped43 and were, in many cases, disputed. The distinction made
by Khama’s government referred simply to the activities conducted by individuals while on
Botswana’s soil, and not to their political memberships or their previous activities.44 There
were two major categories of ‘refugee’ traffic into Botswana, which received different
responses from the authorities in Gaborone. By the 1970s, there was concern about increasing
32 M. Lawrence and A. Manson, ‘The Dog of the Boers: The Rise and Fall of Mangope in Bophuthatswana’,
Journal of Southern African Studies, 20, 3 (1994), p. 453.
33 The South African government refused to engage in negotiations, insisting instead that Botswana must approach
the government of Bophuthatswana, in an underhand attempt to force the official recognition of the Bantustans
as independent nation states.
34 R. Ajulu and D. Corumack, ‘Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland: Captive States’, in P. Johnson and D. Martin,
(eds), Frontline Southern Africa (Peterborough, Ryan, 1989), p. 217.
35 ‘The Constellation of Southern African States: A New Strategic Offensive by South Africa’, Review of African
Political Economy, special issue on Zimbabwe, 18 (May–August 1980), p. 103.
36 G.M. Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security, 1975–1993 (Athens,
Ohio University Press, 1994), p. 220.
37 Sir Seretse Khama, quoted in Q. Masire, Very Brave or Very Foolish: Memoirs of an African Democrat
(Gaborone, Macmillan Botswana, 2006), p. 256.
38 Parsons, ‘The Pipeline’, p. 28.
39 Polhemus, ‘Botswana’s Role’, p. 264.
40 Mbeki, ‘Address of the Patron’.
41 Evans, ‘The Front-Line States’, p. 1.
42 Khadiagala, Allies in Adversity, p. 192.
43 Southall, ‘Botswana as a Host Country’, p. 158.
44 The National Archives, FCO 141/1276, Government Secretary (Mafeking) to Divisional Commissioner South
(Lobatse), ‘Political Refugees: Lobatsi’ (6 May 1960).
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numbers of refugees from Southern Rhodesia, as the liberation struggle there escalated.45 The
majority intended to stay for relatively long periods, seeking financial assistance and
employment. Still an intensely poor country, Botswana lacked the economic resources to
absorb such influxes, and tension between communities began to emerge.46 With numbers
predicted to have reached 30,000 by 1979, Botswana was forced to overhaul its policy of
dealing with refugees on a case-by-case basis, and constructed a large settlement camp at
Dukwi, some 125 kilometres north of Francistown.47 Similarly, in the wake of the Soweto
uprising in 1976, significant numbers of students crossed into Botswana. Reluctant to align
themselves with either the ANC or Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and undertake guerrilla
training elsewhere, many remained in the south of Botswana, where their presence in
significant numbers generated tensions in the towns where they settled, and increased the
diplomatic pressure on the government from their South African counterparts.48
The second category of refugees, and the one with which this article is most concerned,
stayed for much shorter spells in Botswana. The vast majority of those who passed through
the Bakgatla lands were travelling through Botswana on the journey between South Africa
and the bases of the liberation movements in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam. Botswana received a
constant flow of refugee traffic from South Africa, with increases after the extension of the
pass laws in the Republic in 1958,49 and after the suppression and banning of the liberation
movements in the early 1960s.50 Many of the young people who crossed into Botswana after
the 1976 Soweto uprising were categorised, or categorised themselves, as refugees, even
though many were also members of the liberation movements, and their passage was in many
cases part of their activities in support of the struggle. While ‘refugees’ were supposed to
cross at formal points and register,51 the infiltration of the border authorities and activity of
South African agents at these crossings was widespread, and abductions were common. Thus
many of those who entered the Bakgatla lands did so illicitly, and much of the assistance that
was provided facilitated this border-hopping. The length of Botswana’s borders and its
minuscule military force meant that the fences were sparsely policed. The government was
not overly concerned about the transit of such ‘refugees’ through the Botswana ‘pipeline’.52
Many were seeking safe passage through the country and not intending to remain for longer
periods (indeed, most moved on within a matter of days)53 and so were treated with leniency
by the officials.54
Inevitably, the presence of refugees meant that Botswana had constant difficulty in
‘demand[ing] respect for its borders’.55 The threat and reality of violent attack was
permanently present, both before and after independence, accompanied by the continual
presence of South African agents.56 In 1974, a parcel bomb sent from South Africa killed the
45 Morapedi, ‘The Dilemmas of Liberation’, p.76.
46 The National Archives, FCO 45/451: G.D. Anderson (British High Commission, Gaborone) to W. Wilson
(Central and Southern African Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office), 25 June 1970, p. 1; Parsons,
‘The Pipeline’, p. 29.
47 J. Zetterqvist, ‘Refugees in Botswana in the Light of International Law’, Research Report: Scandinavian
Institute of African Studies, 87 (1990), p. 22.
48 Southall, ‘Botswana as a Host Country’, p. 169.
49 Lissoni, ‘Chieftaincy and Resistance Politics’, p. 63.
50 Southall, ‘Botswana as a Host Country’, p. 155.
51 The National Archives, FCO 141/1276, Acting Resident Commissioner (Mafeking) to Commissioner of Police,
Divisional Commissioners, Acting District Commissioners (30 June 1960).
52 Parsons, ‘The Pipeline’, pp. 17–32; Morapedi, ‘The Dilemmas of Liberation’, p. 78.
53 Parsons, ‘The Pipeline’, p. 19; Southall, ‘Botswana as a Host Country’, pp. 158–9.
54 The National Archives, FCO 141/1276, ‘Telegram: Kalahari to Divisional Commissioners and District
Commissioners re. Proclamation 23 of 1960’ (13 April 1960).
55 Bolaane, ‘Cross-Border Lives’, p. 563.
56 Keitseng, Ramsay and Morton, Comrade Fish, p. 49.
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South African Students Organisation (SASO) leader Abraham Tiro when he was in
Botswana.57 Later, MK member Vernon Nkadimeng was killed by a car bomb planted by
South African agents in Gaborone.58 In 1978, South Africa embarked on a conscious strategy
of destabilisation of its unsympathetic neighbours in the region,59 and ‘soldiers wantonly
crossed the border to harass the rural population’.60 In June 1986, ten suspected ANC recruits
betrayed by askari61 Joe Mamasela and en route to Botswana for training were apprehended
just short of the border and executed by lethal injection in a staged road accident.62
In June 1985 the SADF raided Gaborone. Twelve people were killed63 and several
injured.64 The SouthAfrican government insisted that it was a counter-insurgencymeasure that
had hit ‘the nerve centre of the ANCmachinery’.65 Both Botswana’s government and the ANC
denied claims that those killed were involved in illegal activity, and there was international
condemnation of the actions of the SADF.66 The raid marked a turning point for Botswana,
which had until then escaped any large-scale reprisals over the presence of SouthAfrican exiles
– unlike other neighbouring states, such as Lesotho. President Masire insisted that Botswana’s
refugee policy would continue,67 but the ANC offices in Gaborone were closed down.
Cross-Border Networks and the Struggle
Several of the key routes used to cross between South Africa and Botswana were facilitated
by social and kinship networks that were transected by the border. In the late 1950s, a
significant number of BaHurutshe sought refuge from fatal shootings at Gopane, which
followed resistance to the extension of the pass laws.68 By 1960, Lehurutshe, transected by
the major route between Zeerust in the Republic and Lobatse in the Protectorate, had become
a key section of the route taken by members of the liberation movements travelling
northwards or southwards,69 through links and connections facilitated by community and
family networks that transcended the frontier. Lobatse was perhaps the most significant
border town in this regard during this period, thanks in large part to its centrality in Fish
Keitseng’s network of transportation and safe houses that helped large numbers make safe
passage between South Africa and Zambia.70 Once inside Botswana, the major north–south
road and rail route loosely followed Botswana’s eastern border, linking Lobatse, Gaborone,
Francistown and Kazungula on the Zambezi. Francistown, Botswana’s second-largest city,
was a major point on this route, and was also frequently used by Zimbabwean refugees. The
57 Southall, ‘Botswana as a Host Country’, p. 159.
58 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, Vol. 6, Section 3, p. 212, para. 137.
59 Coker, ‘South Africa: a new military role’, p. 145.
60 Mgadla, ‘A Good Measure of Sacrifice’, p.14.
61 Denotes a member of the ANC/liberation movements captured by the South African army and ‘turned’ to work
for the apartheid regime.
62 Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness, p. 23.
63 Ajulu and Corumack, ‘Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland’, p. 209.
64 L. Nyelele and E. Drake, The Raid on Gaborone: June 14th 1985 (Gaborone, E. Drake, 1986), pp. 9–25.
65 Hanlon and Spray, ‘Botswana: Cautious but Outspoken’, p.224; The Star (Johannesburg), 14 June 1985, p. 3.
66 UN Security Council, Resolution 572 (1985) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2609th meeting, on 30
September 1985, S/RES/572 (1985), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16c0.html,
retrieved 18 October 2012.
67 Botswana Daily News, 21 June 1985, p. 1.
68 S. Badat, The Forgotten People: Political Banishment Under Apartheid (Leiden, Brill, 2013), p. 81.
69 Lissoni, ‘Chieftaincy and Resistance Politics’, p. 63.
70 Keitseng, Ramsay and Morton, Comrade Fish; Parsons, ‘The Pipeline’, p. 20; R. Kasrils, The Unlikely Secret
Agent (New York, Jacana, 2010), p. 139; G. Benneyworth, ‘Armed and Trained: Nelson Mandela’s 1962
Military Mission as Commander in Chief of Umkhonto we Sizwe and Provenence for his Buried Makarov
Pistol’, South African Historical Journal, 63, 1 (2011), p. 82; Botswana Daily News, ‘Struggle Hero to be Laid
to Rest’ (1 April 2005).
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significance of such settlements lying close to the frontier and to this route, serving as points
of contact between the border fence and the major transport routes, has received little
attention, beyond the brief acknowledgement that a network of contacts and safe houses was
established by the ANC in towns such Bobonong and Mochudi during this period.71
Straddling a frontier that was violated frequently by South African incursions, the Bakgatla
community was inescapably embedded within the struggle. However, the extent of their
involvement, orchestrated largely by Linchwe himself, was proactive. The Bakgatla were
also critically important: cross-border networks in this region were crucial for the movement
of members of the liberation movements, arms and supplies, in addition to the more
prominent crossing points of Lobatse and Francistown.
The Influence of an Individual
Kgosi Linchwe II was chief of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela from 1963 to 2007. The early period
after independence was an uncertain one for traditional authorities in Botswana, as the new
government attempted to scale down the influence of dikgosi by banning their active
participation in electoral politics and creating the Ntlo ya Dikgosi (House of Chiefs), a purely
advisory body with no legislative power.72 The separation of chiefly authority and electoral
politics was held to be essential in order to protect the free exercise of the franchise by an
electorate new to the democratic process and accustomed to the hereditary rule of chiefs.73
Having stood down as Bamangwato kgosi during the crisis surrounding his marriage, the way
was clear for Seretse Khama, as leader of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), to become
the first President of the Republic. Kgosi Bathoen II of the Bangwaketse similarly gave up his
role to join the main opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF).74 Linchwe
decided not to step down from his position. He became an outspoken critic of the government,
with a keen interest in the politics of the new nation and in smaller, local issues that affected
the Bakgatla. In the Ntlo ya Dikgosi, he participated in key debates – including, notably,
challenging the designation of dikgosi as civil servants in 1973.75 He clashed with the
government over his re-introduction of the bojale and bogwera initiation schools in 1975.
Though he made his opposition to government policy well known when he thought it
necessary, he was also a capable and supportive figure, trusted enough to be appointed as
ambassador to the USA between 1969 and 1972.
The Bakgatla royalty had long-standing connections with the organisations campaigning
for political change in South Africa. Kgosi Linchwe I (Kgosi Linchwe II’s great-grandfather)
had been appointed an ‘honorary vice-president’ of the South African Native National
Congress (SANNC, renamed ANC after 1923),76 while Kgari Pilane, Linchwe I’s brother,
acted as treasurer-general of the organisation,77 and was a founding member of the Transvaal
71 The ANC had several safe houses along the railway that ran parallel to the frontier, ‘with contacts in border
places such as Mochudi’, Parsons, ‘The Pipeline’, p. 20.
72 J.H. Proctor, ‘The House of Chiefs and the Political Development of Botswana’, Journal of Modern African
Studies, 6, 1 (1968), p. 61.
73 C. Logan, ‘Selected Chiefs, Elected Councillors and Hybrid Democrats: Popular Perspectives on the Co-
existence of Democracy and Traditional Authority”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 47, 1 (2009), p. 102.
74 Bathoen stepped down from the chieftaincy in order to contest the Kanye seat against Ketumile Masire, the
incumbent national vice-president and BDP stalwart. He won, and became leader of the party from 1969.
75 M.G. Molomo, ‘Widening the Democracy Debate: Bogosi and Ethnicity in Botswana’, in D.I. Ray, T. Quinlan,
K. Sharma, T.A.O. Clarke, (eds), Reinventing African Chieftaincy in the Age of AIDS, Gender, Governance and
Development (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 2011), p. 451.
76 C.J. Makgala, A History of the Bakgatla-baga-Kgafela in Botswana and South Africa (Pretoria, Crink, 2009),
p. 176–7.
77 J. Ramsay, ‘Happy Birthday ANC’, Sunday Standard, Gaborone, 1 September 2012.
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African Congress.78 Other Bakgatla also played prominent roles: among the founders of the
SANNC was Daniel Letanka, born in Saulspoort in South Africa.79 He was vice-president of
the Transvaal National Congress,80 worked for Bantu World, and was the founder editor of
the newspaper Motsoaelle – the widely read weekly newspaper in the Transvaal, which
merged in 1912 with Abantu-Batho to become the official newspaper of the SANNC.81
Another prominent figure originally from the region was Stephen Segale,82 President of the
Transvaal wing of the ANC Youth League in the early 1960s, who was arrested and
imprisoned many times.83
Linchwe himself had a wide international network of personal contacts, which were
important in the creation and maintenance of the networks that facilitated the cross-border
activity that underpinned his recently celebrated contribution to the struggle. He had been
educated in South Africa and Great Britain, where he had met by chance Naomi Mitchison, a
writer and campaigner who regularly travelled to and stayed for prolonged periods in
Mochudi from the early 1960s until the 1990s, writing prolifically about the Kgatleng, and the
Batswana in the early years of independence.84 In both his official role as Kgosi and for
personal and social reasons, Linchwe regularly travelled to South Africa, not least because
the Protectorate’s administrative capital was located at Mafeking until 1965. He was used to
contact with the South African authorities: ‘he had been bullied, frightened and insulted’ in
South Africa,85 while trying to get a permit for a car, sitting on a ‘whites-only’ bench to eat a
picnic lunch, having been refused service at a restaurant,86 or when attempting to go through
a ‘whites-only’ door at Johannesburg airport.87 He was known for taking an assertive stance
when possible – prohibiting the local station master from entering Mochudi after an incident
when a Bakgatla woman sat on a ‘white’ seat in 1965,88 and replying to racist comments in
Afrikaans in a Mahalapye bar which led to – as described in Mitchison’s typically dramatic
and colourful style – ‘a flaming row, glasses broken, chairs used as weapons, guns out and all
that’.89 Linchwe was also proactive in his opposition to apartheid, and he made his feelings
known as far as he could, given the restraints on his political role. He made several ‘semi-
official’ visits to Zambia. In 1977 he made a call for Bakgatla men to volunteer to fight Ian
Smith’s army in Rhodesia, as the conflict had been spilling over the border around
Francistown and further north,90 and in 1979 helped to launch the Association for Relief
Funds for Victims of External Aggression.91
Linchwe’s hospitable attitude towards refugees and participants in the South African
struggle was well known. In his 1963 installation as Kgosi, he publicly invited people to
78 F. Morton, J. Ramsay and P.T. Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana (London, Scarecrow Press, 1996),
p. 27.
79 E.J. Verwey, New Dictionary of South African Biography (Vol. 1) (Pretoria, HSRC Publishers, 1995), p. 137.
80 P. Limb, ‘Intermediaries of Class, Nation and Gender in the African Response to Colonialism in South Africa,
1890s to 1920s’, in P. Limb, N.A. Etherington and P. Midgeley (eds), Grappling with the Beast (Leiden, Brill,
2010), p. 73.
81 L. Switzer, South Africa’s Alternative Press: Voices of Protest and Resistance, 1880s to 1960s (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 30.
82 Makgala, A History of the Bakgatla-baga-Kgafela, p. 180.
83 South Africa Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democracy, p. 222.
84 J. Ramsay, ‘Kgosi-e-Kgolo Linchwe II (1935–2007)’, Sunday Standard, Gaborone, 26 August 2007.
85 N. Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill (London, Heinemann, 1966), p. 47. It should be noted that Mafeking
became Mafikeng in 1980, and Mahikeng in 2010.
86 Ibid., p. 34.
87 S. Grant, ‘A Chronological Career Summary of Chief Linchwe II Kgafela’, Botswana Notes and Records, 17
(1985), p. 48.
88 Ibid.
89 Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill, p. 188.
90 Botswana Daily News, Gaborone, 12 January 1977.
91 Grant, ‘A Chronological Career Summary’, p. 50.
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Mochudi – ‘in the name of human conscience, we shall always welcome those who have to
leave the Republic as refugees’,92 despite the obvious danger that would be the inevitable
consequence of direct involvement in refugee assistance and visible links with the liberation
movements. He clearly recognised the ways in which the cross-border nature of the Bakgatla
community, and its long history of interaction and kinship transcending the international
boundary, madeMochudi a realistic and viable destination for many who left South Africa for
political reasons, alongside other frontier communities. In 1968, Refugee Advisory
Committees were set up in the settlements that were receiving significant influxes from
outside Botswana – Francistown, Ghanzi, Gaborone, Lobatse, Kasane and Maun, as well as
Mochudi.93 The long-standing links between Bakgatla on both sides of the border and the
liberation movements meant that the section of Bakgatla territory outside the boundaries of
the apartheid state was a convenient safe haven for those attempting to leave South Africa.
Linchwe gave both land and permission for the creation of a community centre to serve as a
transit centre for incoming refugees from South Africa in the wake of the 1960 Sharpeville
massacre. It was the brainchild of Martin Ennals – then General Secretary of the National
Council for Civil Liberties and later Amnesty International – and Nana Mohomo, the PAC
representative in London. Ennals took the advice of Naomi Mitchison, whom he knew in
London and who had just returned from attending the installation ceremony of Kgosi Linchwe
II, in April 1963. Its location and the backing of Kgosi Linchwe II made Mochudi an ideal site
for a base from which to provide assistance to refugees: close to the border and to the border
post at Deerdepoort/Sikwane, and only twomiles from Pilane railway station. Ennals travelled
to Mochudi, and rapidly set about laying the foundations for his project. He approached the
British Colonial Administration and Kgosi Linchwe II, armed with a memorandumwritten for
him byMitchison as an introduction.94 Linchwe agreed to the proposal,95 and donated the land
for the centre provided that it served also as a community development centre for the Bakgatla.
After a series of meetings with Major A.J.A. Douglas, Chief Secretary to the Resident
Commissioner, R.P. Fawcus, in Mafeking, Ennals became increasingly concerned with using
the development project to address the issue of refugees in Mochudi. The administration
limited the refugees whom the centre would be able to assist to those who had already arrived
within the Territory, and it was not permitted to help with entry or border-crossings.96
Construction began on themain building in late 1963, and a boreholewas sunk. Ennals returned
to London and formed the London Committee for the Bakgatla Development Centre, which
was to be chaired by the Labour peer, Lord Listowel, who had been the Governor-General of
Ghana during its transition to independence. The committee had a clear four-year plan for the
development of the Mochudi centre. A hostel was built at the community centre under the
management of SandyGrant, housing refugeesmainly fromSouthAfrica, but also from further
afield, such as a pair of Frelimomembers fromMozambique.97 Among thosewho spent time at
the centre was David Sibeko, the PAC’s Director of Foreign Affairs and Representative to the
UN,98 who was later assassinated in Dar es Salaam.
92 Kgosi Linchwe II’s installation speech, quoted in Makgala, A History of the Bakgatla-baga-Kgafela, p. 272.
93 Mu¨ller, The Inevitable Pipeline, p. 63.
94 Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill, p. 75.
95 Kgosi Linchwe II: ‘I organised for the building of the Mochudi Community Centre as a Refugee Transit Camp’,
M. Moswela, ‘Politics in Kgatleng: Nationalism or Parochialism’, University of Botswana BA research paper
(1980); Mochudi Historical Text No. 15, ‘Interview with Chief Linchwe II’, 14 August 1979.
96 The National Archives, CO 1049/860, A.J.A. Douglas, Chief Secretary, HC Mafeking to Secretary of State for
the Colonies, ‘Note of Meetings with Mr Ennals’, 21 October 1963, pp. 1–5.
97 J. Gumb, letter from Mochudi, 2 November 1965, recipient unknown. Johnny Gumb was a volunteer in
Mochudi between 1965 and 1967, where he set up and ran a printing press at the community centre.
98 Black Panther Intercommunal News Service: David Sibeko Special, San Francisco, 18 March 1972. Sibeko was
known as the ‘African Malcolm X’.
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The refugee assistance project did not develop to the extent originally envisaged by
Ennals and Mohomo. Though geographically close to the border, the land on the South
African side was heavily developed in agricultural terms, which made fence-jumping
difficult. A much easier crossing point was at Lobatse, which thus became the major reception
point for incoming refugees. While most of those coming into and out of South Africa were
en route to Zambia, many also congregated in Francistown, along with most of those from
Zimbabwe. Botswana’s second-largest town was the site of what was called the ‘White
House’, and later the ‘Joint Commission for Relief Work in the High Commission Territories’
sponsored a new refugee transit centre there, which was bombed in 1964.99 Both towns also
had airstrips and better transport and communication links than Mochudi. However, both
Lobatse and Francistown were located in the ‘concessions’ granted to colonial prospectors in
the 19th century, and outside the eight ‘tribal’ reserves in the Bechuanaland Protectorate.100
Part of the London Committee’s rationale for the Mochudi centre had been that the creation of
a further hub for refugees located within the Bakgatla reserve would perhaps be safer and less
vulnerable to South African pressure.101
Instrumental Figures in the Kgatleng
A key player in the networks around Mochudi, who was ‘warned that he was going to be
picked up under the Suppression of Communism Act’,102 was Ismail ‘Ish’ Matlhaku.
Matlhaku relocated to Mochudi in 1963, bringing with him the truck and minibus that had
formed the basis of his taxi business in Johannesburg.103 There, he had been a well-known
figure in the underground political scene, providing clandestine transport for major ANC
leaders, including Mandela and Tambo,104 whom he knew well.105 It was in Johannesburg
that he had met Kgosi Linchwe II’s sister, Tshire, and it was she who introduced the two
during Linchwe’s installation as kgosi in 1963.106 While in South Africa, Matlhaku had been
‘involved ferrying activists to the Botswana border where he helped them scale the fence into
exile’, and he continued to perform the same role from his new base in Mochudi.107 Upon
Matlhaku’s arrival, Linchwe gave him a two-roomed house close to his compound. Listed by
the Ministry of Home Affairs as a permanent ANC refugee in 1965,108 Matlhaku had a wide
network of high-profile connections with those involved in the liberation struggle on both
sides of the frontier.109 His first wife, Happy Letanke, was a relative of the ANC stalwart,
Daniel. He later married Martha Lonake, the sister-in-law of the future PAC President,
Zephania Lekoane Mothopeng – commonly known as ‘the Lion of Azania’ – who served a
series of long prison sentences, including 15 years on Robben Island.110 Martha Matlhaku
arrived in Mochudi to join her husband on an exit permit in 1965, having lived for several
99 Dale, Botswana’s Search for Autonomy, p. 38.
100 O. Selolwane, ‘Colonization by Concession: Capitalist Expansion in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1885–
1950’, Pula: Botswana Journal of African Studies, 2, 1 (February 1980), p. 97.
101 Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill, p. 91.
102 Ibid., pp. 114–5.
103 M. Harper and R. Kavura, The Private Marketing Entrepreneur and Rural Development: Case Studies and
Commentary, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Agricultural Services Bulletin, 51 (1982), p. 59.
104 ‘Shebeen King Activist’, The Sowetan, Johannesburg, 20 February 2003.
105 S. Grant, ‘Et Cetera’, Mmegi, Gaborone, 25 February 2003. Matlhaku’s link to Mandela was important to him,
and he kept a framed photograph of the two of them together displayed in his living room for many decades.
106 ‘Matlhaku to be Buried Tomorrow’, Botswana Daily News, Gaborone, 21 February 2003.
107 ‘Shebeen King Activist’.
108 Parsons, ‘The Pipeline’, p. 26.
109 Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill, p. 146. Mitchison recalls being introduced by Matlhaku to the prominent
Motswana ANC member and Treason Trialist Motsamai Mpho.
110 ‘Shebeen King Activist’.
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years under house arrest in Johannesburg.111 She was also well-connected to the ANC’s
central figures, having worked for several years as Mandela’s personal secretary at the ANC
offices in Johannesburg.112 The Matlhakus had lived in Johannesburg close to the family of
Linchwe’s future wife, Kathleen Nono Motsepe, when she was working as a nurse in
Baragwanath Hospital.113 Building up a small business empire, starting first with a small
butchery in Mochudi which then expanded to Gaborone, and then a general store in
Artesia,114 Matlhaku remained a central figure in Mochudi: he was the main contact to whom
Martin Ennals referred Sandy Grant upon his arrival in 1963,115 and both Grant and
Mitchison recalled being picked up by his familiar taxi to be taken to the town from the Pilane
railway station.116
Kgosi Linchwe II’s well-known support for the struggle meant that a number of
prominent figures visited Mochudi regularly throughout this period, and were known to be in
close contact with him and other members of the royal house. Among them were Duma
Nokwe and Alfred Nzo, successive general secretaries of the ANC between 1958 and 1991, as
well as the PAC representative in Botswana, Solly Ndlovu.117 Chris Hani reportedly stayed
for extended periods with a certain Mmoloke Moje in Mochudi.118 A crucial element was the
development of an ANC cell based at Molefi secondary school by the teachers Sipho
Buthelezi and Eugene Mokeyane Mohulatse, to provide a base for both temporary ANC
visitors and students who had relocated from South Africa and enjoyed the relative security
offered by the fact that the South African police were unable to operate as freely within the
confines of a school campus as they could elsewhere.119
The ‘Underground Military Machinery’ in Botswana
Linchwe personally supported those who came to Mochudi, including hosting several
individuals as they made the journey through Bakgatla territory.120 He engaged in debate
111 Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill, p. 200.
112 S. Grant, personal communication, 15 October 2012.
113 ‘Matlhaku to be Buried Tomorrow’, Botswana Daily News.
114 Harper and Kavura, The Private Marketing Entrepreneur, p. 60.
115 S. Grant, personal communication, 11 April 2012.
116 Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill, p. 194.
117 Author’s interview, Gaborone, 13 August 2013. This interview with a key operative in the activities of the ANC
in Botswana gave a useful overview of and insight into the process of crossing the border and evading detection
by the South African security forces.
118 Victor Ramono Linchwe, personal communication, 12 August 2013. The informant is an uncle of Kgosi Kgafela
II, the son and successor of Kgosi Linchwe II. In a supporting affidavit signed in January 2013, submitted to the
NorthWest High Court, Mafikeng, Republic of South Africa (RSA), in the ongoing case of Kgosi Kgafela II and
the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela Traditional Community vs. The Premier of North West Province, the M.E.C.
responsible for traditional affairs in the North West Province, Nyalala John Molefe Pilane, and the Traditional
Council of Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela, the informant declared the following in clauses 13–14: ‘In 1975, I joined
Kgosikgolo Linchwe II as his second in charge, in a project which was called Underground Military Machinery
which operated in Botswana under the command of Kgosi Linchwe II, but supervised by the leadership of the
African National Congress (ANC). Kgosi Linchwe and I concealed and distributed arms for the ANC and
accommodated refugees in Mochudi during the armed struggle’.
119 Author’s interviews: Mochudi, 1 August 2013; Mochudi, 14 August 2013; Gaborone, 8 August 2013. All three
of these informants were closely involved in the activities of the liberation movements in Mochudi and the
Kgatleng. The first was a South African, resident in Botswana since 1961, who co-ordinated ANC cadres in
Mochudi and the surrounding area. The second was the son of a key ANC operative in Johannesburg, but was
himself born in Ramotswa, Botswana. He was a member of the Medu Art Ensemble, which was founded in
Gaborone by South African exiles and was known to provide cover for ANC activities in Botswana. The third
was a journalist based in Mochudi, and was close to Kgosi Linchwe II throughout this period.
120 Author’s interview, Mochudi, 4 September 2012. The informant is a close family member of Kgosi Linchwe II,
who was alive throughout this period.
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with and offered advice to those he came into contact with,121 including through his football
team, which included several South Africans.122 Mbeki’s speech, to which we referred
earlier, and the affidavit of Victor Ramono Linchwe123 suggest that Linchwe’s main role in
the ‘struggle machinery’ concerned the transport and storage of weapons.124 According to
Kgosi Linchwe’s wife, and also to key ANC activist Scara Aphiri, storage sheds were built
within the chief’s compound, and later the weapons were secretly moved to the Nfetledi
cattle-post, which he had converted for the purpose, (‘our wardrobes are still there’)125, 30
kilometres or so northwards into the bush.126 After the unbanning of the ANC and the PAC in
1990, Kgosi Linchwe andMbeki met at the soccer match between Botswana and South Africa
held in Gaborone national stadium in 1992.127 Together they agreed that Linchwe would
inform the Botswana police that, as a result of his position as a traditional leader, he had been
made aware of the existence of the arms caches that remained at his cattle-post, and that they
should come to retrieve them.128 The ANC had no further need for them, and it was in
nobody’s interests to put the public at risk by leaving them untouched, while it conveniently
allowed Linchwe to find a way for the police to seize the weapons without him ‘getting into
trouble with the government’.129
South African Counter-Insurgency in the Kgatleng
Throughout this period, the South African security forces were well informed of political
activity in Mochudi. They had an extensive intelligence network of informants within
Botswana: armed police drove around Mochudi and the surrounding area at will,130 and they
were able to pinpoint individuals involved in refugee assistance. The sense of the everyday
threat posed by the South African security forces was as potent in Mochudi as in the rest of
Botswana. The South African Air Force ‘buzzed’ Mochudi during the Independence Day
celebrations in 1966,131 aiming to deliver a ‘warning to refugees of the wrath to come’.132 In
July 1964, the ‘White House’ refugee centre in Francistown was bombed,133 and there was
little doubt that efforts to assist refugees and members of the liberation movements were
121 Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill, p. 54: ‘I had realised that there was a good deal going on and that there were
doubtless tie-ups with various bodies which one might call the resistance’.
122 Author’s interview, Mochudi, 24 September 2012: ‘I used to sit with them and him together, off the pitch, and I
used to hear him telling them how to go about in the struggle and everything – assisting them . . . advancing
information’.
123 Supporting affidavit signed in January 2013, submitted to the North West High Court, Mafikeng, RSA, in the
ongoing case of Kgosi Kgafela II and the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela Traditional Community vs. The Premier of North
West Province, the M.E.C. responsible for traditional affairs in the North West Province, Nyalala John
MolefePilane, and the Traditional Council of Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela, the informant declared the following in
clause 15: ‘My mission (UMM) [Underground Military Machinery] which I had to carry out in Botswana ended
in 1994 when South Africa attained democratic rule. The last arms cache we had was dug out at a farm presently
belonging to the first applicant [Kgosi Kgafela II] and handed over to the Botswana police in 1995’.
124 Mbeki, ‘Address of the Patron’: ‘The late and outstanding Botswana and African patriot, Kgosi Lentswe, was
part of the machinery we established before the ANC representative arrived, which enabled the ANC to pass war
materiel through Botswana, to enable us to carry out military operations in South Africa’.
125 Author’s interview, Mochudi, 4 September 2012.
126 Author’s interviews, Mochudi, 24 September 2012; Mochudi, 4 September 2012; Mochudi, 1 August 2013.
Victor Ramono Linchwe, personal communication, 12 August 2013.
127 Author’s interview, Mochudi, 1 August 2013.
128 Mbeki, ‘Address of the Patron’.
129 Author’s interview, Mochudi, 25 September 2012. The informant was a prominent figure in both the Mochudi
and national political spheres throughout this period.
130 S. Grant, ‘Botswana: the Mochudi Community Centre (1)’, Mmegi, Gaborone, 18 November 2005.
131 Mitchison, Return to the Fairy Hill, p. 216.
132 Parsons, ‘The Pipeline’, p. 23.
133 South Africa Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democracy, p. 425.
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fraught with danger. In June 1979, two suspected activists were abducted by South African
forces at Ramothlabaki in the Kgatleng.134 During the 1980s, the SADF made several raids
into the small border village of Oliphant’s Drift.135 On 23 April 1990, the Chand family from
Sikwane (on the border) were murdered and their house bombed by a unit from the Vlakplaas
special branch, led by Eugene de Kock. Sam Chand, a trader, had assisted members of the
PAC and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) to cross the border over several
decades. De Kock’s testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996
confirmed that Chand’s house was targeted as a suspected ‘PAC stronghold’,136 in a brutal
attack that sent shockwaves through Botswana society. Both Chand and his wife, along with
three sons, two of whom were disabled, were shot repeatedly at point-blank range with
automatic weapons.137 Before returning to South Africa, the commandos planted a large
amount of explosives that completely destroyed the house.138
Given the extent of South African intelligence, and the bombings, kidnappings and
assassinations elsewhere, it is perhaps surprising that there was not a direct attack on the
refugee assistance base at the Community Development Centre. This was probably partly due
to the relatively low numbers of refugees the centre was able to help, despite its bigger
original ambitions,139 in comparison with similar facilities located elsewhere, such as in
Lobatse and Francistown. It was also a high-profile affair, owing to its international origins
and the original sanction it had received from the colonial administration under Peter Fawcus.
Linchwe was never served with a banning order or subject to a direct attack on his life,
probably owing to his status within Botswana. In any case, the South African authorities did
not ‘eliminate’ several other figures heavily involved in the struggle from Botswana, such as
the Matlhakus in Mochudi and, in the wider Botswana context, Fish Keitseng and Motsamai
Mpho, all of whom were well known to the security forces.
Conclusion
The extent to which a significant number of Botswana’s citizens assisted and were involved in
the activities of the South African liberation movements has been obscured by the official
stance of non-participation that the central government was forced to take throughout this
period. The case of Kgosi Linchwe II and the Bakgatla people has demonstrated the existence
of significant cross-border networks of support in a borderland region that has as yet received
little attention in the context of the South African struggle. This local example is of particular
significance because it was made possible by the involvement and leadership of a figure of
traditional authority. Linchwe’s status as Bakgatla chief not only afforded him the power and
legitimacy necessary for effective local governance in this region, but also meant that
channels of participation that were closed to the politicians of the central government
remained open for him and his associates. Linchwe’s active support of members of the
liberation movements is a demonstration of the potential for individual agency and political
134 Mgadla, ‘A Good Measure of Sacrifice’, p. 10.
135 Makgala, A History of the Bakgatla-baga-Kgafela, p. 278. It is unclear exactly where the location referred to as
Rathlokwa is: a cattle-post approximately 15 kilometres from the village of Oliphant’s Drift is commonly
referred to by this name, but, if so, why it was of special interest to the SADF is unknown.
136 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Application No. AM: 0066/96, Murder of Chand Family, Day 5,
available at http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/amntrans/1999/9905240623_pre_990531pt.htm, retrieved 8 January
2015.
137 Author’s interview, Gaborone, 14 August 2013. The informant is a close family member of the Chand family,
and was resident in Gaborone at the time of the attack at Sikwane.
138 Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness, p. 87.
139 Parsons, ‘The Pipeline’, p. 23.
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involvement offered by the nature of chieftainship in 20th-century Botswana. The resilience
of chiefly legitimacy underpinned Linchwe’s ability to mobilise both human and material
resources within his community in support of a political cause where the central government
could not act. Despite official policies of non-participation, Botswana’s borderlands were
inevitably intersected by numerous routes well-trodden by members of the liberation
movements travelling into and out of South Africa. Where communities that pre-dated the
construction of the border existed, the potential for travel and refuge was particularly
significant. The Bakgatla region is a crucial example of this, with the networks of kinship,
communication and commerce that underpinned a community identity based on the structures
of chiefly authority that transcended the international border.
Mochudi thus became the centre of a transnational network of individuals and
organisations engaged in the anti-apartheid struggle. The town played a significant role in
hosting, supporting and assisting refugees. The foundation of the Community Development
Centre as a base for refugee assistance was important, as was its sanction from both
Linchwe’s local and Fawcus’ colonial administrations. Mochudi became a base and refuge,
whether temporary or permanent, for numerous individuals involved in the liberation struggle
in South Africa. This was made possible by the involvement and personal activity of Kgosi
Linchwe II, who used the authority, influence and resources that were the basis of his chiefly
power to participate in an international political sphere with a greater degree of flexibility and
agency than the national government.
Mbeki’s recent account of the covert yet direct role of Kgosi Linchwe II in assisting both
refugees and the struggle serves as an illustrative example of the wide network of
communication, co-operation and assistance that operated across the region throughout this
period. This provides an alternative perspective on the highly contentious debates about the
role and actions of traditional authorities in this region during the struggle. Though realpolitik
determined the non-involvement of the national government, this perspective demonstrates
that channels of support for the liberation struggle among the Batswana were of a deeper and
more diverse nature than has previously been acknowledged.
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